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Dollarization in Latin America: 
W ave of the Future or Flight to the Past?
Kenneth P. Jameson
Latin American economic, policy during the 1990s was guided by the “W ashington 
consensus,” which embodied the orthodox model’s espousal of free trade and economic 
liberalization (W illiamson 1990). M acroeconomic perform ance improved over the lost 
decade of the 1980s, aided by new' capital inflow's. However, Nancy Birdsall and Augusto 
de la Torre (2001, 6) noted that “in economic growth, poverty reduction, income 
distribution, and social conditions the results were discouraging.” This outcom e is no 
surprise to institutionalists and those no t com mitted to the orthodox model 
(Lichtenstein 2000; Schneider 1999; W en t 2000).
The W ashington consensus left the issue of exchange rate regime open, suggesting 
“that achieving a ‘com petitive’ exchange rate is more im portant than how' the rate is 
determ ined” (Williamson 1990, 1.3-14), although floating rates had “some support in 
W ashington . . .  as the more im portant [principle]” (1.3). However, David Felix (1997/8) 
docum ented increased exchange rate volatility and its detrim ental effect on trade, 
investment, financial stability, and macroeconomic policy in Latin America. Taking a 
Keynesian perspective, he pointed to capital mobility after the demise of Bretton W oods 
as the main contributor to this discouraging performance.
O rthodox economists placed the onus on bad domestic policy or faulty choice of 
exchange rate regime. After the collapse of their pegged rates in the Asian miracle 
economies, orthodoxy dem anded that countries operate in a bipolar world, either 
floating their currencies or adopting a hard peg such as dollarization (Fischer 2001 a). In 
addition, the successful European transition to the euro, active research on optimal
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currency areas (Panizza, Stein, and Talvi 2003; C ourchene and Harris 2000), and 
widespread use of die dollar in Latin America com bined to suggest dollarization as a 
solution to the problems noted by Felix. Ecuador undertook official dollarization in 
2000 when it destroyed its own currency, the sucre, and adopted the dollar. El Salvador 
converted all financial instrum ents to dollars, and G uatem ala now allows transactions 
to be carried ou t in any currency. Both assumed that the dollar would soon displace 
their domestic currencies. This experience suggests that dollarization may become 
progressively easier for o ther countries. Indeed, there are num erous predictions of a 
completely dollarized W estern Hem isphere (Schuldt 2003; Trejos 1999; “La 
Dolarizacion Sera U na Realidad en la Proxima Dccada,” by Eduardo Tuculet, Tiempos 
del Mundo, July 19, 2001, B24-27).
Will other countries in the W estern Hem isphere im plem ent official dollarization 
this decade.7 Could Latin America become an official dollar bloc, with the dollar as the 
com m on currency.7 Alternatively, will dollarization be a m om entary phenom enon, 
whose promise is tarnished by the economic perform ance of countries that have chosen 
hard pegs.7'
In answering these questions, I use the methodology of “pattern models” described 
in W ilber and H arrison 1978. My model, and po in t o f departure, is to characterize 
Latin Am erica’s in ternational financial relations as a “dollar bloc,” an inform al but 
powerful system that binds their currencies to the dom inant currency, the dollar 
(Jameson 1990). This relation, and its supportive institutions such as the International 
M onetary Fund and the W orld Bank, dom inates Latin Am erica’s in ternational eco­
nom ic relations. W hether official dollarization becomes the general choice of exchange 
rate regime in Latin America in this decade depends on the extent to which dollar­
ization becomes one of the rules of the dollar bloc; it is a question of the institutional 
evolution of the dollar bloc (Jameson 2001).
I structure the argum ent as follows. In  the first section I place dollarization in 
historical context, since dollarization is path dependent and the historical experience 
will affect how the dollar bloc evolves. In the m ain body of the paper, I examine the most 
extreme contem porary dollarization program, tha t of Ecuador. Any future dollarization 
decision will no t result from  bloodless calculation of costs, benefits, and optim ality of 
the chosen exchange rate regime. Rather, issues of power and of the political goals of 
actors and institutions will play the dom inant role. In turn, they will be heavily 
influenced by contem porary experience with dollarization. I treat Ecuador’s experience 
in four dim ensions. I docum ent the Ecuadorian m acroeconomic perform ance that 
spawned dollarization and then  describe the powerful interests that developed and 
pushed dollarization as the preferred response to its economic problems. Next, I assess 
Ecuador’s economic perform ance under dollarization, which leads finally to a 
discussion of possible alternative policies. The conclusion is that dollarization has had a 
num ber of positive elements; however, both  the contem porary economic perform ance 
and the future prospects for Ecuador are m odest and completely dependent on external
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trends. Dollarization has no t addressed the central econom ic issues of Ecuador. In the 
final section, I conclude tha t dollarization will no t become a policy of choice for dealing 
with the problem s of exchange rate instability unless the major international players 
begin to push and support th a t policy. There are few signs at present of pressure in this 
direction.
Dollarization Past and Present
Official dollarization, the formal adoption of the dollar as the domestic currency, is 
no t a new phenom enon, and unofficial dollarization has long existed in  Latin America.
Panama was the first country in  the W estern Hem isphere to dollarize officially. 
W hen it became an independent nation  in 1903, the balboa was established as its 
official currency, based on the gold standard at “1.5046 grammes of pure gold” (Crosby 
1915, 23). However, the dollar was already a familiar currency in the country, and 
because of the U.S. role in Panam a’s creation, the governm ent allowed the dollar to 
circulate freely at $1 = 1 balboa, as agreed in the dollar association treaty with the 
U nited States. In addition, the $10,000,000 paid to Panam a for the right to build the 
Panam a Canal, augm ented by a $250,000 paym ent per year and expenditures by canal 
personnel, made dollars abundan t (M cCullough 1977, 612). A lthough the balboa 
could still be traded in New York at a 14 percent discount in 1915, it was naturally 
supplanted as the m edium  of exchange because of dollar availability and the existence of 
a dollarized economy in the C anal Zone. There was a short-lived populist effort in  1941 
to restore the national currency by printing paper balboas. Its failure relegated the 
balboa to its curren t status as supplem ental coinage.
Panam a’s econom ic perform ance has often been used to argue for dollarization in 
other countries. Juan Luis Moreno-Villalaz (1999) claimed tha t low interest rates, low 
inflation, good G D P growth, and a stable real exchange rate were evidence that 
dollarization can improve m acroeconom ic perform ance. A  more detailed study found 
the evidence mixed (Goldfajn and Olivares 2001). Inflation in  a dollarized economy 
does decline, and it may provide some insulation from external shocks. However, 
Panam a’s low interest rates may be the result of its internationalized banking system 
rather than  dollarization. M ore im portant, dollarization has n o t enforced fiscal disci­
pline, reduced G D P growth instability, nor removed the volatility of interest rate 
spreads on sovereign debt. Indeed, Sebastian Edwards suggested tha t the major effect of 
dollarization has been to give Panam a a preferred position in the dollar bloc, allowing 
Panama to use the IMF as a “lender of first resort” (“The IMF is Panam a’s Lender of 
First Resort,” The Wall Street Journal, Septem ber 24, 1999, A15).
C uba’s M onetary Law of 1914 allowed the dollar to circulate freely at a fixed rate 
with the peso and banned transactions in Spanish or European currencies (Wallich 
1960). As late as 1931, dollars constituted more than  80 percent of C uba’s currency." In 
the early 1920s, a proposal to establish a branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of A tlanta
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in  Havana was seriously considered since the country had no central bank. The Fed’s 
agency in  C uba took responsibility for providing needed liquidity un til 1938. Despite 
efforts to  increase reliance on  the peso starting with the G reat Depression, in 1947 
dollars and dollar deposits still accounted for 45 percent o f the C uban  money supply 
(153).
Mexico provided an example of “unofficial” dollarization during the last century. 
The country had switched from a silver-based currency to the gold standard in  1905, 
“and the system worked splendidly from  the time it was p u t into effect un til the year 
1913” (Crosby 1915, 19). A t tha t point, com peting insurgent groups began to issue their 
own currency and there were as many as twenty-one different currencies in  circulation 
in  Mexico. Finally, the only generally acceptable monies were gold or silver coins, for the 
most part m inted in  the U nited States. M onetary stability gradually returned after 1925, 
though as late as 1933, 33 percent o f deposits were in foreign currency (dollars). This 
share fell rapidly, to 6 percent by 1937, after the depression interrupted dollar flows and 
the exchange rate was fixed. The 1937 devaluation and float led to an increase in  the 
dollar deposit share un til a new fixed rate was established in late 1940, when it fell back 
to 6 percent (Ortiz 1982, 441-443).
These experiences suggest th a t unofficial dollarization will occur under three 
circumstances:
• W hen there is ample availability of dollars to the domestic economy.
• W hen domestic instability affects the health of the financial system and the 
confidence of domestic economic actors.
• W hen governm ent policy allows a dollarized sector to exist w ithin the domestic 
economy.
These elements contributed to the unofficial dollarization of much of Latin 
America in  the 1970s and 1980s. First, in ternational financial institutions facilitated 
petro-dollar recycling and provided access to  dollar-denom inated loans from  1973 to 
1980. Loans to Latin America increased five-fold, from $48 billion in  1973 to $220 
billion in 1980. D ebt and interest payments increased from $2.7 billion to $21 billion 
per year.3 Second, even prior to  the debt crisis of 1982, econom ic instability had 
increased throughout the hem isphere because governments attem pted to  postpone the 
reckoning for increased oil prices. O il producers such as Mexico were n o t im m une, for 
after the peso’s devaluation in 1976 the share of dollar deposits began to rise rapidly. 
Finally, when Latin American governm ents reduced exchange controls in  the 1970s, 
the third elem ent became a reality. For example, foreign currency deposits in  Uruguay 
rose from 5 percent in 1973 to 45 percent by 1977. In  1984, dollar-denominated 
deposits were 74 percent o f total deposits in  Peru (Jameson 1990, 523). This reversed a 
conscious policy by Latin Am erican governments to restrict the use of non-national 
currencies, which had been encouraged by the post-W orld  W ar II, U.S.-based “money 
doctors” such as Robert Triffin (Helleiner 2003b, 5).
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The post-1973 experience affected the relation of Latin America to the dollar in 
several ways, creating the inform al “dollar bloc” tha t currently exists. First, generating 
dollar revenues became a major concern of all governments, for the debt had to be paid. 
Defaults, such as those of the 1930s, were no t acceptable and were very costly as 
discovered by Ecuador in 1999 and A rgentina in 2002. Second, the mechanisms for 
moving between dollars and the dom estic currency were now well known to domestic 
actors, facilitated by the availability of “dollar deposits” in the liberalized national 
banking systems. Thus, it became very difficult for governments to constrain the 
behavior of dom estic econom ic actors, who could often avoid policy changes by going to 
the dollar sector. In addition, after 1987 the Federal Reserve Board’s policy of targeting 
short-term interest rates increased in ternational dollar liquidity. The share of U.S. 
currency held outside the USA may be as high as 66 percent (Carlson and Keen 1996).
As a result, the exchange rate regime became a central policy issue in all Latin 
Am erican countries. The case studies in Frieden and Stein (2001) and Wise and Roett 
(2000) docum ent tha t the wide range of policies th a t Latin Am erican governments had 
used to m aintain international equilibrium  have been superceded by the requirem ent 
to establish and m aintain a credible and competitive exchange rate. W hen it became 
progressively m ore difficult to utilize the “fixed b u t adjustable,” or “crawling peg,” 
regimes th a t had been characteristic since the demise of Bretton W oods in 1973, the 
orthodox position was th a t countries m ust choose between floating rates or a hard 
peg—such as dollarization (Fischer 2001a). For orthodoxy, the central task of 
governments was to reassure in ternational capital markets, given mobile capital. Dollar­
ization could succeed in this regard, since it allowed no independent monetary policy 
and was very difficult to reverse.
O n  the other hand, C arol Wise and R iordan R oett (2000) showed tha t neither 
fixed nor floating regimes guaranteed superior econom ic perform ance during the 
1990s. Despite highly placed supporters such as Stanley Fischer, who was the deputy 
managing director of the IMF, the argum ent for dollarization remained far from 
compelling. So we m ust learn from actual experiences. In tha t regard, Ecuador’s official 
dollarization provides an exceptional laboratory to study the effects of such a hard peg. 
Let us tu rn  now to examine the four aspects of Ecuador’s dollarization noted above.
Ecuador's Dollarization
W hen President Jamil M ahuad announced a vague dollarization program on 
January 9, 2000, few of the criteria for entering an optim al currency area were met 
(Panizza, Stein, and Talvi 2003). The major exceptions were tha t Ecuador was a small, 
open economy and th a t its C entral Bank had low credibility in econom ic policy matters. 
Indeed, no econom ic policy maker had credibility after sixteen m onths of M ahuad’s 
adm inistration. Since purely econom ic factors did n o t necessitate dollarization, we 
m ust look to power relations and to institutional forces for our explanation.
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Let us first review Ecuador’s econom ic perform ance as part of the dollar bloc to 
show how th a t system dom inated domestic perform ance and laid the basis for the 
dollarization dem anded by powerful coastal interests.4
Economic Instability: The Road to Dollarization
Ecuador has no t been a strong econom ic perform er. Only in  the 1970s, with its 
first significant oil production, did Ecuador’s growth exceed the Latin American 
average GDP growth rate (table 1). As a result Ecuador’s per capita GDP in 1997 was 
almost the same as in 1980, and it had fallen relative to average G D P in Latin America. 
The investm ent pattern  was similar.
O n  the other hand, the degree of disequilibrium  in the economy was far less than  
the average in Latin America. Inflation rose after the 1970s but, on average, was relatively 
stable in  the 1980s and 1990s at 35 percent. G overnm ent’s share of GDP was less than  
average and the governm ent generally ran  a surplus, in contrast to  persistent deficits in 
other countries.
Underlying the stability, however, were changes tha t would become the source of 
later problems. The external debt grew rapidly from $600 m illion in 1973 to  $16.4 
billion in 1998. Per capita debt was $100 in  1973 and grew to $1,360 in 1998; as a 
percentage of GDP it grew from 20 percent in 1973 to its high po in t of 118 percent in
1998.
Table 1. Latin American and Ecuadorian Economic Performance
I .aim America/Caribbean
1971-80 1981-90 1991-97
Per capita GDP growth 3.3 -0.4 1.6
Per capita GDP (USS)' 2900 2653 3025
Average inflation 46.7 192.1 268.0
Gr. dom. invest, growth 7.6 -1.7 5.9
Govt. exp. ( % of GDP)1’ 19 22.5 23
Govt. deficit(% of GDP)' 2.2 1.7 1.5
Ecuador
1971-80 1981-90 1991-97
Per capita GDP growth 6.3 -0.6 1.5
Per capita GDP (USS)' 1378 1264 1392
Average inflation 13.8 36.6 34.9
Gr. dom. invest, growth 10.7 -5.1 2.3
Govt. exp. (% of GDP)' 14.2 15.6 18.5
Govt, deficit (% of GDP)1’ -1.4 -2 -1.3
Sources: IDB, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1998; World Bank., World Development Report, .1984, 1990, 1992, 
1994; ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean., 1988, 1999.
“Last year o f  period.
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In addition, the in ternational sector began to reflect the norm al dollar bloc pattern: 
dram atic fluctuations in curren t and capital account balances, growing reliance on 
foreign direct investm ent and portfolio investment, and instability in total reserves 
(table 2). The evolution of the dollar bloc opened Ecuador to shocks transm itted 
through in ternational capital markets (Atkinson 1999). Most notably, international 
reserves were subject to  dram atic swings. For example, in 1996, reserves increased by 
$245 million as a result of capital inflows; in 1999, the outflow on capital account 
caused reserves to  decline by $215 million.
The deterioration in economic perform ance after 1997 was dram atic (table 3). 
Since dollarization was spawned between 1997 and 1999, let us examine those years in 
more detail. The underlying causes of the deterioration were in the in ternational and 
financial sectors. Despite devaluation and a depreciated real exchange rate, exports 
declined in 1998, mainly as a result o f the oil price decline. They barely increased in
1999. However, the current account deficit of 11 percent of G D P in 1998 became a
Table 2. International Dollar Flows to Latin America and Ecuador
Latin America
1980 1985 1990 1996 1999
Trade balance -1,548 33,082 30,509 2,197 -19,700
Service balance -29,333 -38,149 -6,582 -11,806 -14,650
Income balance -20,285 -35,416 -35,564 -42,902 -54,455
Current account balance -29,508 -1,440 -1,541 -37,115 -56,370
Cap/ fin account balance 35,005 2,584 16,807 63,745 43,490
Direct investment 5,709 4,132 7,029 37,824 70,725
Port to li o i n ve s t m e n t 13,565 -1,669 -1,586 -12,276
Change in Reserves -2,321 1,142 -15,123 -27,015 3,480
= Increase)
Ecuador
1980 1985 1990 1996 1999
Trade balance 303 1,294 1,009 1,220 1,655
Service balance -974 -1,225 -112 -91 -145
Income balance -524 -936 -1,374 -1,308 -1,725
Current account balance -642 149 -360 111 885
Cap/ fin account balance 980 -203 345 1,449 -1,485
Direct investment 70 62 126 447 655
Port to li o i n ve s t m e n t 79 0 219 995
Change in reserves = Increase) 270 -24 -195 -245 215
Sources: IDB, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1980: 1985 Report; 1985: 1989 Report; 1990, 1996: 1998 Report. 
ECLA.C, Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999 (Santiago, Chile, 1999): 
1999-estimated.
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surplus of 6.9 percent because im port dem and collapsed along with the domestic 
economy. Im ports nearly halved, to $2.7 billion from  $5.2 billion. Foreign investm ent 
increased as a share of the declining GDP. Though it rose from  $69 m illion in  1997 to 
$82 million in  1998, it then  fell to $6.3 million in  1999. In ternational debt fell slightly 
b u t increased as a share of GDP, to 118.3 percent. So the pressure that m em bership in 
the dollar bloc placed on Ecuador’s economy increased. The only way to rem ain current 
on  debt repayment, as dem anded by the dollar bloc, was to draw down reserves, which 
nearly halved. The sovereign debt spread increased five-fold.
The international deterioration triggered defensive domestic econom ic policies 
that were incapable of confronting the problems. Per capita growth was only 0.4 percent 
in  1998 and crashed to -7 .3  percent in  1999. Inflation began to accelerate to 43 percent 
and then  to 61 percent. The exchange rate collapsed to 6,825 sucres per dollar and then 
to 20,242 in  1999, devaluations of 54 percent and 197 percent. The rate of investm ent 
halved to 12.9 percent of GDP, and unem ploym ent increased from 11.8 to 15.1 
percent.
The financial sector also destabilized. C ontrary to the position of the “new 
institutional econom ists,” the liberalized financial institutions of Latin America have 
yet to attain  stability. This highlights the im portance of understanding institutional 
developm ent from a traditional institutionalist perspective, or “original institutionalist 
economics” in Geoffrey Schneider’s terms (1999, 325). The major banks became 
insolvent through a com bination of fund diversion and insider dealing. Uncollectibles 
rose from  9.6 percent of outstanding loans to 40.4 percent in  1998. Pressure came from 
the fiscal side as well, where the deficit increased from 2.6 percent of GDP to 6.1 
percent, falling slightly to 5.9 percent in  1999. The governm ent forced the consti­
tutionally independent C entral Bank to finance the deficit, as well as a bank rescue 
program of the ill-conceived deposit guarantee agency. Thus the m onetary base 
increased by 41 percent in  1998 and 174 percent in  1999. There was disinterm ediation 
as M 2/G D P  fell from  32.5 percent to 23.2 percent. The decline might have been far 
greater bu t for a freeze on  bank  deposits imposed in  M arch 1999.
Unsurprisingly, the political situation also destabilized. The finance minister 
resigned in  early 1999 because the opposition dem anded a 1 percent financial 
transactions tax; then  the C entral Bank unilaterally floated the sucre on February 12. 
Inflows of official in ternational resources can often stabilize such situations, and 
Ecuador hoped to gain access to $2 billion in  multilateral loans by midyear. Congress 
stifled the required reforms and held up the loans, which led in  O ctober 1999 to a 
unilateral declaration tha t Ecuador would postpone paym ent on its Brady bonds and 
would restructure all o f its debt, except that owed to multilateral institu tions.1
O ne elem ent of the m oratorium  was the acquiescence of international agencies, as 
part of their nascent efforts to make private lenders bear some of the losses on  bad loans. 
Ecuador may have been used as the guinea pig in  this experiment, for the IMF 
authorized a $400 million standby loan despite the m oratorium . The private sector held 
the stronger hand, however. It forced an official default on  one class of Brady bonds,
Table 3. Ecuadorian Macro Performance, 1997-2002 (est.)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 (e) 2003 (e)
External sector
Exports,mmS 5,264 4,203 4,451 4,846 4,685 4,581 5,702
Imports, mmS 4,666 5,198 2,786 3,212 5,232 5,602 5,980
Curr k \ i  G PP -3.6 -11.0 6.9 10.1 -4.3 -7.6 -1.8
For. inv./C.DP 3.5 4.2 4.6 5.2 7.4 8.1 6.0
For debt, mmS 15,099 16,400 16,282 13,458 14,410 14,640 14,620
i-or debt'"C.riP 76.4 83.2 118.3 98.6 80.1 72.9 65.5
Reserves, mmS 2,093 1,698 1,276 1,180 1,074 1,004 1,337
Reserves, mos. 4.3 3.2 4.4 3.5 1.9 1.7 2.2
Fiscal %GD1>
Revenues 23.8 20.4 25.5 29.0 27.2 25.1 24.5
Expend. 26.3 26.5 31.5 28.6 26.8 25.9 24.0
Fiscal surplus -2.6 -6.1 -5.9 0.4 0.4 -0.8 0.5
Primary surplus 2.5 -1.1 2.7 8.2 7.1 5.2 6.1
Money sector
Inflation—Dec. 30.7 43.4 60.7 91.0 22.4 12.8 8.4
Exch rate—Dec 4,428 6,825 20,423 25,000 25,000 25,000 25,000
PVvaluation 21.8 54.1 196.6 23.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Money base 31.6 41.2 174.0 -58.1 10.5 7.1 10.1
growth
Credit growth 49.6 37.0 144.1 -1.2 22.6 14.6 16.1
Bad loan % 7.1 9.6 40.4 47.8 39.6 21.0 15.0
M i GDP 30.9 32.5 23.2 29.7 28.2 29.4 32.8
Sov. debt spread 597 1,334 2,754 1,435 1,186 988 603
Moody rating Bl B3 Caa2 Caa2 Caa2 Caa2 Caa2
Real exch. 100.0 99.6 138.3 155.4 109.4 97.2 94.3
rate—’97 = 100
Real return—S 2.5 22.8 144.8 -59.8 -17.4 -6.8 -2.3
Real sector
C.PP.mmS 19,760 19,710 13,769 13,649 17,981 20,093 22,310
G P P  per cap S 1,655 1,619 1,109 1,079 1,396 1,532 1,671
Real C.riP growth 3.4 0.4 -7.3 2.3 5.4 3.6 5.2
Inv./C.DP 19.0 24.7 12.9 16.8 24.1 26.7 26.2
Saving/GDP 15.4 13.7 20.0 26.9 19.8 19.2 24.4
Urban unemp. 9.3 11.8 15.1 10.3 10.4 10.9 9.5
Sources: 1997-2000: Cornell 2001. 2001-2003: Dr. Xavier Arcos, country economist for Ecuador and Mexico, Corporadon 
Andina de Fomento.
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and so Ecuador could no longer renegotiate and restructure portions of its debt. 
“Cross-default clauses” in agreements forced Ecuador into default on its external bonds 
while removing access to  additional funds. O ne in ternational financial player said, “The 
bottom  line is tha t Ecuador w on’t have access to private credit un til the foreign debt is 
restructured. . . . There is no question tha t the level o f economic deterioration is going 
to  increase very, very quickly” (“Ecuador Faces More H urdles to Resolution of Debt 
W oes,” by Thom as T. Vogel, The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 1999, A25).
This led President M ahuad to make his desperate dollarization declaration. 
“Desperate” is an apt description because he had dismissed dollarization only days 
before, the policy was opposed by the C entral Bank, which had characterized it as 
“rushed, crazy measures” (Notisur 2000), and it led to  the resignation of the C entral 
Bank president and of the entire cabinet.
Let us now ask whether there were other options to deal with the turm oil and, if so, 
why dollarization was the course chosen.
Dollarization and Economic Power
W hile drastic steps were necessary, there were alternatives to  dollarization. Some of 
the potential alternatives were political, for example, dismissing Congress in a 
“Fujicoup” such as President A lberto Fujimori undertook  in Peru in 1992, in order to 
im plem ent a coherent economic policy. A convertibility program and a currency board 
to counter inflationary expectations were economic alternatives. E ither would have 
allowed greater policy flexibility and would have provided credibility, based on the 
post-1991 Argentine experience. The most viable alternative was a direct attack on the 
financial liberalization tha t was at the center o f instability by “sucretizing” financial 
accounts, restricting capital flows, and fixing the exchange rate.5
W hen  President M ahuad announced dollarization, he was giving in to  well- 
orchestrated pressure by powerful interests, located mainly in Guayaquil, the country’s 
main port. It is economically powerful, closely linked to the in ternational economy 
through exports of bananas and shrim p and its dom ination  of the im port trade.
Joyce de G inatta (2001) of the C ham ber of Small Industry (Guayaquil) provided 
one account o f the process. According to her, interest in dollarization began with a 
December 1995 study on “Ecuador: To the New C entury and M illennium .” O ne of 
those magical/real experiences of Latin America came next. Abdala Bucaram of 
Guayaquil was elected president in 1996. Shortly after taking office in August, he met 
with Domingo Cavallo, un til then economy minister o f Argentina and architect of their 
convertibility program, enlisting him  to “transm it the Argentine experience.”7 Eco­
nom ic and political instability made Bucaram ’s December 1996 announcem ent o f an 
Argentine-style convertibility program, to  go into effect in July 1997, appear to be a 
desperate attem pt to save his regime. The economic basis for his program was n o t clear.8 
Convertibility had succeeded in stopping A rgentina’s hyperinflation, b u t Ecuador’s 
inflation was only 24 percent and had been relatively stable. The program did not
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address the underlying fiscal, labor, production, and political problems. So at issue was 
economic and political power, and Bucaram lost. He was removed from  office in 
February 1997, and the idea of convertibility w ent with him  into exile in dollarized 
Panama.
Nonetheless, interest in  dollarization continued. De G inatta’s organization went 
on record in favor in  September 1998, and there were several conferences on dollar­
ization in 1999, initially with Ecuadorian speakers. Next came the international experts: 
Kurt Schuler from  the U nited States, who was working with Senator C onnie Mack on 
legislation supporting dollarization, Jose Luis C ordeiro from  Venezuela, M artin Krause 
of Argentina, and Juan Carlos Leal of Mexico9 (de G inatta 2001).
As a result, in  a replay of 1996, a desperate politician facing m ounting opposition 
proposed a radical exchange rate regime, dollarization. There were alternatives that 
might have made more economic sense, such as sucretization with capital controls. 
However, none of them  had the support o f economic interests as powerful as those 
pushing dollarization. It was an ironic twist tha t dollarization only hastened M ahuad’s 
departure, for he was soon overthrown in a popular/m ilitary insurrection.
Dollarization stayed, however, at the behest o f the new president, Gustavo Noboa, 
a form er university president from  Guayaquil. He was aided by sudden congressional 
willingness to  pass the necessary legislation and by im m ediate offers of technical 
assistance from  the IMF. This promised a solution to M ahuad’s major failure, his 
inability to gain access to  in ternational financial resources. By September 10, 2000, the 
dollar became the official currency, and the sucre now exists only as supplem ental coins.
Dollarization provided the dollar bloc’s “good housekeeping seal o f approval” 
necessary to free the IMF stabilization funds. Ecuador began to draw on a $304 million 
standby loan on April 1, 2000 ($114 million), which opened access to $2 billion from  
other multilaterals, despite private bondholders’ opposition. This allowed restructuring 
of the external debt, exchanging Brady bonds for bonds with a face value 40 percent 
less.10 The second installm ent of the IMF loan, $41 million, accompanied the com­
pletion of dollarization on September 10. Policy turm oil did no t end, however. The 
economy m inister resigned in December because of disagreem ent with the IMF on  the 
size of the Value Added Tax (VAT) hike, so the IMF held up the third disbursem ent of 
$42 million. S treet dem onstrations erupted against IMF-mandated adjustments; calm 
was restored only when they were partially rolled back. The carrots o f $240 million from 
the W orld Bank and IDB and of a $ 1.3 billion deb t restructuring by the Paris C lub did 
n o t mobilize congressional action. Finally, on  May 31, 2001, the governm ent imple­
mented an increase in the VAT to 14 percent, which freed $49 million from  the IMF 
and $70 million from  the W orld B ank.11 The IMF agreed to disburse the remaining $96 
million of the standby loan in  December 2001.
So dollarization has become a reality, and its end result for Ecuador’s economic 
policy makers has been greater access to the international capital flows needed by 
members o f the dollar bloc. Political fatigue has dim inished protests and allowed a 
return  to some semblance of normality—w ithout dealing with any of the fundam ental
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underlying problems of the country. Let us now examine Ecuador’s economic perform ­
ance under dollarization through 2001, noting the lessons for other countries that 
might consider dollarizing.
Assessment of Dollarization
Since Ecuador’s dollarization is only three years old, any assessment will necessarily 
be tentative. In addition, its political genesis caused other problem s. O ne exponent of 
dollarization and currency boards, Steven Hanke, called Ecuador’s law “vaguely worded 
and foolishly am bitious” and added, “Success will hinge on  the im plem entation and 
w hether someone in the governm ent actually takes a leadership role and gets the 
m om entum  going” (Notisur 2001). Proponents also claim tha t the C entral Bank 
ham pered the program by actions ranging from poor publicity to failure to provide 
sufficient coins for small transactions.
O n  the o ther hand, as shown by A rgentina in 2002-200.3, economies rebound 
after shock-induced recessions. Significant im provem ent in the economy after 1999 was 
expected, and this was the case in 2000-2001. The underlying question is whether this 
implies tha t the Ecuadorian economy is on a different and more successful path as a 
result o f dollarization. Table .3 provides inform ation on economic perform ance, 
including projections for 2002-200.3.
Increased access to foreign dollar flows, to  foreign saving, has been the crucial 
factor in recovery. Dollarization has succeeded in tha t regard. The curren t account 
balance improved to 10.1 percent of G DP in 2000, as oil export revenues increased 
more rapidly than  imports. However, in 2001 im ports accelerated, especially in  durable 
goods, which resulted in a current account deficit o f 4-3 percent of GDP. O ne notable 
dollar inflow has been em igrant remittances, which rose to $1.4 billion in 2000 and 
became the second largest earner of foreign exchange. Foreign investm ent increased to 
7.4 percent of G D P and continued strong in 2002 as work on a new oil pipeline 
progressed. The debt load decreased as a result of the debt restructuring and payments 
m oratorium . However, international reserves continued their slow decline to $1 bil­
lion, and their im port coverage declined to  1.9 m onths. Fiscal pressures remained 
under control as a result of greater revenues from oil sales and improved value added tax 
collections. Nonetheless, budget deficits returned in 2001 and 2002, though there was a 
primary budget surplus in  both  years.
GDP grew by 2.3 percent in  2000, by 5.4 percent in 2001, and more than  .3.0 
percent in 2002, though per capita GDP is returning only to its 1997 level. Investm ent 
returned to its 1998 rate and unem ploym ent decreased to 10.4 percent, aided in part by 
the continuing em igration of skilled and unskilled labor.
This modest im provem ent disguises growing imbalances. Dollarization promised 
to make domestic inflation converge to  international rates. In actuality, inflation 
accelerated to 91 percent in 2000 as a result o f the inflationary effects of the deval­
uation, o f inertial inflationary impulses, of changes in relative prices toward inter­
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national prices, and of price-setting behavior by monopolistic sectors in the economy, 
including public utilities. Inflation has decreased bu t was still 22.4 percent in 2001 and 
almost 10 percent in 2002. This slow and partial convergence to in ternational inflation 
rates will further underm ine competitiveness. The exchange rate had appreciated to its 
1997 level by 2002. In  2000, non-petroleum  exports had fallen by one-third from the 
1997 level, and their trajectory for 2001 was again downward, though more slowly.
Financial indicators have no t improved. The final failure of the largest bank, 
Filanbanco, in July 2001 added to tha t instability.12 Ecuador’s debt rating remains poor, 
Caa2, in the middle of the th ird  from lowest category. The one contribution  of 
dollarization was the decline in the interest rate spread from 2,700 basis points to 1,186 
because dollarization reduced exchange rate risk. Nonetheless, country risk remained 
quite high.
W hat can we conclude about dollarization’s effects on Ecuador’s economic per­
formance? From a political-economic standpoint, it has succeeded in providing access to 
in ternational dollar resources, in other words, to foreign saving. Dollarization was 
largely responsible for the debt renegotiations, the renewal o f official flows of loans, and 
new foreign investm ent projects. Inflation does appear to be decreasing toward inter­
national rates. In addition, the entire process, including the pressure from the IMF, has 
lowered the fiscal deficit and has prevented the governm ent from monetizing the most 
recent bank failure.
In the medium  to long term , how will the economy function? For the m om ent, 
access to  foreign saving is supportive: IMF support o f the new Gutierrez governm ent 
and ongoing negotiations with creditors, com bined with stable oil income and rem it­
tances. T he list suggests how insecure these sources are, however. O il’s price has been 
unstable, though increased production may stabilize revenues. Em igrant remittances 
rem ain dependent on  economic perform ance of industrial countries. Foreign invest­
m ent has been for specific projects and will decline upon their com pletion. Agreem ent 
with creditors will increase the dollar drain, as payments resume. Finally, exports that 
are price-sensitive are declining and will continue to do so, for o ther countries com­
peting for foreign markets will be able to change their real exchange rate to aid their 
producers.13 In  the m edium  term  the economy may continue to  improve; however, it 
will progressively move toward the lim it o f its access to foreign saving, the major 
contribu tor to improved economic perform ance. Decreased remittances, lower oil 
prices, or higher debt payments would hasten the arrival o f the date.
How sustainable will this situation be? Ecuador’s underlying political problems 
remain: unequal income distribution—both size and regional, deteriorating public 
services, peasant unrest, and political instability. The medical doctors who had no t 
emigrated were on strike for m uch of the middle part o f 2001, protesting salaries in the 
public health system tha t were a maximum o f $ 180 per m onth. A  state o f emergency was 
declared in January 2002 to protect work on the new pipeline. Elements o f the 
Gutierrez coalition had already moved into opposition by A pril 200.3. Domestically, 
dollarization may have only exacerbated political tensions. For example, the ongoing
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bank bailout has been widely perceived as protecting the interests of certain powerful 
political and banking interests at the cost of the com m on depositor. In  addition, the loss 
of seigniorage, estimated at $897 million, or 6.2 percent o f the G D P (Baquero 2000), 
reduces governm ent’s ability to effect an im provem ent in  income distribution  through 
its expenditure policies. T he coastal im porters have benefited, bu t even others in the 
in ternational sector, for example, exporters and tourism  vendors, are being h u rt by the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate.
So the future of Ecuador under dollarization does no t seem to differ greatly from its 
past. M ost elements of political controversy remain, and new ones are being added. 
Prices for basic goods are still set by the government, and removal of subsidies, which 
affects large portions of the population, occasion dem onstrations, resistance, and 
rollbacks of price increases. Salaries o f governm ent employees are low and are often no t 
paid, so strikes are com m on and continual, and the fiscal policy flexibility is severely 
constrained. Independent monetary policy has disappeared, and the economy depends 
almost entirely on its in ternational reserves for its m onetary base. The C entral Bank 
might affect the monetary system through changes in  bank regulations, bu t given the 
weakness of the banking system there is little room  to m aneuver in this regard. This is 
further lim ited by the scrutiny of the international organizations and international 
capital providers.
Political stability and international support have certainly aided econom ic per­
formance. W hen and if tha t changes, the pattern  seen in A rgentina is likely to appear: 
slower growth, increasing unem ploym ent, structural fiscal deficits, and continuing 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. A  crisis like A rgentina’s is very likely w ithin 
several years.
O ne possible solution to all these problems is increased productivity and com­
petitiveness. Some feel Ecuadorian coastal agriculture could improve its productivity. 
However, it is very unlikely that, even with low inflation and a stable real exchange rate, 
Ecuador could become an “A ndean tiger.” The best case for Ecuador may be the 
“Bolivian pattern ,” a relatively stable bu t stagnant economy in which incomes grow 
minimally and then  only in response to in ternational m arket conditions. For example, 
if the price of oil remains high, growth may continue. But Ecuador will be hard pressed 
to improve in ternational competitiveness in products like cut flowers, bananas, or 
shrim p enough to offset an appreciated exchange rate. Domestic deflation could 
accomplish the same thing, bu t this has its own problems and is far in the future.
Let us tu rn  finally to how Ecuador’s m acroeconom ic policy may evolve in coming 
years, as the current experience is assimilated.
Are There Alternatives for Dollarized Ecuador?
Dollarization has removed one elem ent o f conflict from Ecuador’s political scene: 
the exchange rate. Based on  the preceding analysis, the only realistic way perform ance 
can improve is through reducing the burden  of the debt owed to the international
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financial system, thereby increasing the resources that can be dedicated to domestic 
needs. Dollarization promised increasing inflows of capital to Ecuador, since exchange 
rate risk disappeared with the sucre. In  the short run, it delivered on  the promise. 
However, larger economic forces will dom inate and will disadvantage Ecuador in the 
long run.
Are there any alternatives for a country that has dollarized, or adopted a hard peg, 
and whose economic perform ance is inadequate? This is an ongoing debate in Ecuador, 
and there are several positions.
The m ainstream suggestion is tha t structural transform ation of the economy must 
continue and be com pleted, that “illiberal enclaves” must be rooted out. Full inte­
gration of Ecuador into the in ternational economy will provide improved economic 
perform ance. Paul Beckerman (2001, .35) wrote, “The structural reform  agenda remains 
large. M uch of it involves changes to mitigate the vulnerability o f the fiscal accounts and 
banking system to Ecuador’s unusually broad array of contingencies.” Ecuador should 
also learn from  Panam a that “it needs to ensure solid international backing for its 
banking system” (.36). U nderstanding of institutions and their evolution suggests that 
this program should be regarded with a high degree of skepticism.
Augusto de la Torre (2001, .3) suggested tha t the economy requires labor market 
flexibility and institutionalized cushions. The first would facilitate within-country 
mobility and downward wage adjustm ent.14 The second would im plem ent rules for 
fiscal discipline, some fiscal stabilization, internationalization of the banking system 
with prudential norms, and diversification of the risk of natural disasters. The goal 
would be to avoid the “high cost/low  productivity trap” tha t our analysis suggests is 
Ecuador’s future.
Abelardo Pachano (2001) carried the cushion concept further. He proposed 
diverting any increased oil revenues from  the new pipeline and putting them  into 
several stabilization funds. Such a step would perm it active stabilization policy and 
would direct resources into areas that could increase productivity. He also addressed the 
reality that Ecuador’s overvalued exchange rate will destroy domestic production and so 
Ecuador m ust protect segments of import-competing industries, using escape clauses 
and modifying the rules of in ternational integration in Ecuador’s favor.
Controversy over dollarization in  Ecuador continues, and opponents are devel­
oping alternative programs, despite President G utierrez’s support for continuation  of 
dollarization. A t this po in t the most interesting proposals have come from the “Foro 
Ecuador A lternativo” in Q uito  (Valencia 2001). They note that currently the only way 
to stimulate the economy is through added external borrowing or more governm ent 
spending financed by higher taxes. Their central proposal is to restore to the C entral 
Bank the power to create currency^sucres, A ndean pesos, or Ecuadorian dollars^under 
strict lim itations and at a one-to-one parity with the dollar. This would stimulate efforts 
to develop a com m on currency among the A ndean countries. M uch of the rest o f their 
sixteen-point program specifies how these funds would be used to raise productivity, 
especially through regional and social development, how oil revenues could be used to
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buy back debt and raise capital form ation, how dom estic industry should be protected, 
and how productivity could be increased by better econom ic policy and knowledge 
form ation.
There are two questions about these proposals. First, could this expansion of the 
C entral Bank’s ability to stimulate the economy be carried ou t w ithout reducing 
Ecuador’s access to the in ternational capital tha t has become its basis for growth? 
Second, is there any reason to believe tha t the stimulus such a program could provide 
would actually result in higher productivity and greater competitiveness, in contrast 
with the experience of the country to  date?11 The latter question brings to the fore the 
political factor in  any policy change for the country.
Ecuador’s experience should influence other countries’ decision on dollarization. 
Let us retu rn  to our m ain question: W ill o ther countries in  Latin America move toward 
dollarization as a result o f the experience o f the official and complete dollarization of 
Ecuador, and will this eventually result in a formal dollar bloc?
Will Latin America Dollarize?
Latin America has adapted to the reality o f the W estern H em isphere dollar bloc, to 
the econom ic and financial power of the U nited States. The process was costly in the 
1980s, the lost decade; the 1990s saw significant improvements. The first decade of the 
twenty-first century appears to be more like the 1980s than  the 1990s. The system is 
again generating instability th roughout the hem isphere. The Brazilian real has crashed, 
going from a stable 1 .9/$ to more than  3 /$  before stabilizing at tha t level. The C hilean 
peso has h it new lows, Argentina and Venezuela continue in econom ic turm oil, and 
C olom bia is engulfed in political/m ilitary conflict. G row th projections for Latin 
America have been lowered yearly, and G D P fell by 0.5 percent during 2002. Foreign 
investm ent in Latin America was dow n by 50 percent during 2001. This reflects the 
worldwide slowdown and is exacerbated by A rgentina’s default on  portions o f its $141 
billion debt.
W ill Latin America follow Ecuador and dollarize in order to avoid a repeat o f the 
1980s? As a starting point, we need to realize how atypical the 1990s were in the U nited 
States and, by extension, in Latin America. It was a tim e of unprecedented growth that 
is unlikely to be repeated, with extensive corporate restructuring and realignm ent o f the 
location of world production  facilities. The result was increased m ultinational 
corporate involvement in Latin America, partly because of privatization efforts b u t also 
because of the globalization o f finance and production. The dollar bloc analysis suggests 
that, at this point, the key to stability and growth is the ability o f countries to balance 
their dollar incomes with their dollar dem ands, represented largely by their debt 
repaym ent obligations. C apital inflows of equity or portfolio investments, remittances 
from migrants, and exports provide dollar inflows. Access to multilateral loans is the key 
to being able to adjust to  imbalances in  dollar inflows and outflows. The policy
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challenge is to  generate the resources needed for stability and growth, while continuing 
to function as a national economy rather than  as a simple dependency of the U nited 
States.
If the dollar bloc continues unchanged, Latin America will continue to be at the 
mercy of international capital flows. A  shock in  one country or area can affect capital 
flows to many other areas, though the Bush adm inistration tried to  minimize its 
im portance. Former Treasury Secretary Paul O ’Neill stated, “Exaggerating the pos­
sibility of contagion leads to  too-frequent intervention because, in effect, we convince 
ourselves we d o n ’t have a choice” (“Volatility Isn’t  Infectious, Say Bush Advisers,” by 
M ichael M. Phillips, The Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2001 ,A2). T he Bush adm inistration 
contributed to A rgentina’s default by supporting the IMF refusal to disburse funds in 
December 2001.
If there are no fundam ental changes in how the dollar bloc functions, we can 
expect a continuation  of the pattern  seen during the last twenty years: instability 
generated by capital flows, domestic economies forced to  adjust to those shocks, and 
continued inability to  deal w ith the d istributional imbalances tha t grew during the 
1990s. The mediocre perform ance of the 1990s would be the best tha t could be hoped 
for, and the likely outcom e is m uch worse (Birdsall and de la Torre 2001).
Ecuador has differentiated itself from the rest o f Latin America by adopting 
dollarization, the extreme o f the hard peg. In  its first three years, the balance has been 
positive, alm ost entirely because it has given the country greater access to international 
dollar resources. Nonetheless, a more detailed look at its economic perform ance 
suggests tha t the factors tha t have aided perform ance are unreliable and tha t underlying 
trends in international competitiveness are very negative. Thus the country may soon 
reach the limits o f its debt-carrying capacity and the dollar drain  may again drag down 
the economy. In addition, aggregate economic activity is likely to stagnate in coming 
years, and there are few policy tools to  attack this problem.
The conclusion is tha t the attraction o f dollarization for most economies will be 
relatively m inor. A rgentina’s economic problems, leading it to abandon convertibility, 
should further call into question the desirability o f such hard pegs. W hile El Salvador 
and G uatem ala m erit further attention, it appears tha t the success o f Ecuador was so 
specific to its circumstances tha t other governments would be unlikely to dollarize 
unless they had no other op tion .16
Two changes could alter this conclusion. Ecuador has hitched its cycle to the dollar 
at a tim e when the U.S. economy has weakened. If the U.S. economy were to recover 
and return  as the engine of world growth, Ecuador’s economic perform ance would 
improve and dollarization would appear more appealing. Second, if the IMF, the W orld 
Bank, and the U.S. Treasury climbed on the dollarization bandwagon and supported it 
with specific resources, other countries would have an added incentive to  dollarize. 
There is no evidence tha t such a change in policy is forthcom ing. The U.S. stance on 
dollarization has been neutral to supportive in public, while at the same time asserting
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vigorously that U.S. monetary policy will be operated completely independently of the 
desires and needs of dollarized economies. The position that the U nited States will 
never act as a lender o f last resort for a dollarized economy that may face a liquidity crisis 
has been even m ore strongly expressed (Summers 1999). The IMF was quite willing to 
allow Ecuador to be the guinea pig in defaulting on its Brady bonds and in dollarizing, 
w ithout taking a formal position. There were even indications that, as he left the IMF, 
Stanley Fischer was softening his “bipolar” view that countries need either floating rates 
or hard fixes (2001b). This implies weakened support for dollarization.
The rem aining question is whether dollarization will act as the “seal of approval” 
for the in ternational system that would give an implicit default guarantee to inter­
national capital. In reality, Ecuador’s dollarization has played that role, encouraging 
both  private and public capital flows tha t contributed to improved perform ance in 
Ecuador in 2000-2002. However, it is no t clear that such a guarantee would be effective 
for other countries or for the hem isphere as a whole. Simply because a country dollarizes 
says nothing about its ability to repay in ternational obligations, just as convertibility did 
no t prevent debt default. So unilateral dollarization, with the implied loan from the 
Latin American countries to the U nited States, will n o t change the nature of the dollar 
bloc nor solve the problem  of instability and mediocre econom ic perform ance. Only 
changes in the nature of the dollar bloc could give that result, changes that do not 
appear to be in the offing.
Notes
1. The “hard peg” position was certainly weakened, in 2002 when Argentina abandoned 
convertibility after ten years and. regained stability within the year. This has underlined the 
“trilemma” of a fixed rate with capital mobility and resulting impotence of monetary policy. 
Argentina’s current predicament supports the cautions about global finance expressed by 
Glen Atkinson (1999) and. illustrates Dani Rodrik’s (2000) “augmented trilemma.” He 
suggested that “global federalism,” the kind of institution advocated by Atkinson, might be 
able to address the contradictions o f this bipolar world, while encouraging international 
economic integration. Tangible U.S. support o f a formal dollar bloc would be a radical 
departure in this direction, though there is no indication it will be forthcoming. See Helleiner 
(2003a, 2003b) for insightful historical treatments o f U.S. policy toward dollarization.
2. In an ironic turn, the dollar resumed its importance in Cuba in the 1990s after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. O ne of the current tensions in the Cuban economy is the effect that access to 
dollars has on relative real incomes.
3. The debt problem reflects Latin America’s historic tendency to rely on foreign saving to offset 
its own low domestic saving rates (Hausmann and. Reisen 1997). Disruptions to flows of 
foreign saving are reflected in domestic economic performance.
4. The next sections draw on a series o f reports from the Latin American Data Base Notisur and 
from international news reports archived in “Academic Universe o f Lexis-Nexis” (Lexis-Nexi.s,
2000, 2001).
5. Paul Beckerman (2001) has provided, a readable and. very careful economic interpretation of 
this era. He focused on “semi-dollarization” as the accelerant in this debacle. 1 find the main 
source to be the continuing international debt drain and the constraints it imposed on 
domestic economic performance and. policy.
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6. Economists at the Central Bank had developed a plan for sucre tization and had presented it 
in convincing fashion to international policy makers prior to the dollarization declaration. 
(Personal communication to the author.)
7. Ahdala Bucaram told critics, “ 1 ask all you economic geniuses ou t there who are grumbling 
and questioning [Domingo Cavallo’s visit] just what medicine i t is they take. If they take any 
medicine to save their lives, they found it abroad, not here” (Notisur 1997). History was 
certainly on Bucaram’s side regarding foreign influence on Ecuadorian economic policy.
8. Former Vice President Alberto Dahik, from his exile in Costa Rica, provided the most telling 
view of the underlying political pressures for dollarization: “Society needs to understand that 
this is not a change in the monetary and exchange rate system. It is a reconquest and renewal 
o f ecuadorian society.. . .  It is a new order insisting on  privatization and elimination o f the 
privileges o f  bureaucratic sectors” (“No Habra Perdon de Dios,” by M artin Pallares, El 
Universoy January 17, 2000, 7).
9. The title o f  one o f  the conferences gives the tenor: “Dollarization Is the Only O ption” (de 
G inatta 2001).
10. The face value o f  $6.65 billion in Brady and Eurobonds was reduced by 40 percent, to $3.95 
billion. However, this only reduced the debt service on  the total debt o f  $13.4 billion by 10.8 
percent annually over the 2001-2005 period (Cornell University 2001, 4).
11. In August 2001, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled the VAT hike unconstitutional, and the 
government rolled it back to 12 percent. Increased tax revenues from oil and the economic 
recovery, along with increased emigrant remittances, had provided a fiscal cushion that 
removed fears that the fiscal deficit would spiral out o f  control.
12. The July 2001 closure o f Filanbanco, after being taken over by the Deposit Guarantee Agency 
in December 1998, led President Gustavo Noboa to claim that he had been misled on its 
status until October 2000. His admission sparked widespread comment.
13. The recent depreciation o f  the dollar will help Ecuador’s competitiveness in Europe, which 
accounts for 30 percent o f  exports. It will not aid trade with the U nited States (36 percent) or 
with other Latin countries.
14- Increased out-migration and the apparent decline in real wages suggest that the labor market 
has already made significant adjustments, without changing overall economic performance.
For example, the May 2001 real minimum wage was 20 percent below its value o f  August 
1996.
15. Argentina’s productivity actually increased quite rapidly under convertibility, bu t that was 
insufficient to avoid its collapse into chaos.
16. Although former President Carlos Menem had espoused dollarization as the route to 
Argentina’s stability?, that proposal had little support by the elections o f  2003, given the return 
o f stability?. Menem downplayed dollarization in his unsuccessful presidential campaign.
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